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Metalinguistic Abilities in Preschool Children
Jeffery A. Hogge
Brigham Young University
During the past fifteen years, the study of metalinguistic
abilities in preschool children has become widespread, involving those interested in measuring what young children know
about language. Definitions of "metalinguistics" range all
the way from "the ability to view language as a disembodied
1
entity" to "the ability to make lang~age forms opaque and
attend to them in and of themselves."
The disagreement on
the definition and the apparent need to supply a definition
in every study suggest that the study of metalinguistics in
children is still in very early stages. There is general
agreement, though, that metalinguistic ability has something
to do with the ability to view language as a disembodied
entity and make related judgments. Metalinguistic abilities
have been tested by measuring a person's ability to articulate
a metaknowledge of language.
It has been assumed in the studies that metalinguistic abilities are not available to infants and toddlers who have not
yet developed the cognitive abilities necessary for such a
task. This is most probably a good assumption and will be
accepted for this study. This paper questions another assumption that researchers have made in their studies of metalinguistic abilities: that is, that metalinguistic abilities
are a result of natural language development. Metalinguistic
abilities not only require the development of the necessary
cognitive abilities, but they also require some sort of
teaching to be articulated by native speakers.
In a study which I conducted in 1983, three children were
interviewed using Hakes' methods of testing for metalinguistic
abilities.
The results showed that, eventhough the judgments
of young children were quite accurate, the ability to explain
the judgments progressed v r y slowly until the age when they
would have started school. 3 More details of the study will
be presented later, but with this brief summary it is interesting t_Q note that judgments were at a high level of accuracy
at an early age, yet the ability to explain the judgments was
not as accurate. (see Table 1)
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A look at a theory of language will help explain why children
begin to develop the ability to articulate metalinguistic
awareness about the time they start school.
In their paper on second language acquisition, Brown and
Williams discuss the transparency theory of language as
described by Michael Polanyi. They point out how the fact
that language is an instrument and not an object of the
speaker's attention makes a difference in second la~guage
learning as opposed to second language acquisition.
The
same principles can be applied to a child's first language
acquisition. To show this we can go back to Polanyi's discussion.
In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi describes skills and the
thought processes involved in them:
The aim of a skilful performance is achieved
by the observance of a set of rules which
are ngt known as such to the person following
them.
Bicycle riding is a skill that involves rules that the bicyclist is almost never completely explicitly aware of, but
that he is tacitly aware of. In order to ride a bicycle,
the person must provide a curvature of each winding that is
inversely proportional to the square of the speed for a
given angle of imbalance. 6A bicyclist must obey this rule
if he is to avoid falling.
Language is a skill, also. There are certain rules of
grammaticality, meaning and other essential elements that
the speaker must obey if he is to succeed in communicating.
If a person were tested for his knowledge of how to ride a
bicycle by having him watch someone else fall down and then
being questioned as to why the person failed, it probably
would not yield a good evaluation of the person's own skill
in riding a bicycle, and it would probably yield no reference
to the rules that are only tacitly understood. The person
being tested for meta-bicycle-riding ability could be very
capable of following the rule given above for maintaining
balance, but only those who were taught exactly what the rule
is would be able to indicate that the person who fell off the
bicycle failed at a given point to provide the curvature of
the winding that would be inversely proportional to the
square of the speed. Not knowing this rule explicitly and
being expected to give a reason for the failure, a person
might even resort to irrelevant answers, such as the cyclist's
going too fast or the bicycle's poor quality.
Language is transparent. We are able to use language, as a
skill, following the rules, eventhough we may be unable to
articulate those rules. If we are asked if something has
been said correctly or incorrectly, we can give a description
of the rules broken only if we have been taught how to articulate
those rules, whether it be through formal schooling or some
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other mode of education. Questions involving metalinguistic
explanations for incorrect utterances can yield irrelevant
answers. Although the person being questioned may have a tacit
awareness of the rules that are being violated, without being
taught how to articulate the rules, the person would not have
an explicit knowledge of the rules.
In my study already briefly summarized, Wade (3;10) was able
to judge whether sentences were formed correctly 83% of the
time, while his explanations for his judgments did not reflect
a good metalinguistic awareness. When asked to judge the
sentence "Any men ate lunch," he stated that the sentence
was "bad". When asked why, Wade paused for a few 15econds with
a perplexed look on his face and finally came up with the
explanation, "If the men don't eat lunch when it's time,
they'll get in trouble." 7 I t is highly unlikely that Wade
could make correct judgments at a rate of 83% with this type
of logic. It is much more probable that Wade, realizing that
he was unable to articulate his reason for making the judgment,
found another explanation that he could articulate. This
new explanation was not correct, but it did fulfill the need
to give the interviewer an explanation.
It appears that Wade was tacitly aware of the rules being
violated because he was able to judge incorrect sentences as
such, but it also appears that he was incapable of articulating those rules. This fits well with Polanyi's definition
of a skill. A look at the studies that have been done on
metalinguistic abilities in small children will reveal that
the researchers have assumed that the ability to articulate
metalinguistic awareness is a result of natural language
development. If language is a skill, though, then the
ability to articulate metalinguistic awareness would have to
be taught by supplying the speaker with the understanding and
vocabulary necessary to vocally analyze language, just as it
is necessary for a person to understand some physics and the
jargon involved in order to articulate the reasons why a
person has failed at riding a bicycle.
The studies of metalinguistic development in children did
not begin until the 1970's. The biggest reason for the late
start was the lack of an effective way to measure the metalinguistic abilities in young children. A study done by
Brown, Fraser and Bellugi in 1964 proved unsuccessful
because of the dif§iculty encountered in eliciting judgments
from the children.
In 1970, Gleitman, Shipley and Alloway suggested a possible
way of eliciting acceptability judgments from two-year-olds.
They used simple imperatives, such as "Throw the ball" or
"Ball the throw" to elicit judgments of "good" or "silly"
from the children. The young children were also asked to
repeat the "good" sentences and to correct the "silly" sentences. This proved to be an effective way of measuring
the children's abilites in judging the acceptability of the
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sentences presented to them. With the development of Gleitman
et al. 's new method, others began to study metalinguistic
abilities in children.
The early studies claimed that most judgments made by young
children are based on semantic acceptability rather than
syntactic acceptability. In other words, the children were
apparently unable to disassociate the words from their
meanings. Vygotsky had written that, t§ a child, a word
is an integral part of what it denotes.
The young children
were unable to articulate any recognition of a syntactic aspect
of language. De Villiers and de Villiers claimed that
semantic corrections were made by the two and three-year-olds,
while syntactic corrections proved to be beyond their capacity. Since children use language to convey meaning, it seems
reasonable that semantic explanations would be available to
them as far as ability to articulate them goes. The children
in the study were asked to judge simple imperatives and correct
them (e.g., "Cake the eat" to "Eat the cake"). Only the most
linguistically advanced of the eight children was able to
make direct word order corrections on more than 50% of the
attempts. Three consistently changed the word order, but also
changed the mrtlning (e.g., from "Doggie the find" to "Pat
the doggie").
For adults it may seem obvious that "Doggie
the find" is really just an inverted form of "Find the doggie",
but it may not be as obvious for young children. These
researchers claimed that the child's changing of "Doggie the
find" to "Pat the doggie" is evidence that the child was
unable to focus on problems of syntax. On the contrary, the
syntax was, in fact, corrected. There is no evidence that
the reseachers ever indicated to the children that the meaning
could not be changed, if "Doggie the find" does really have
meaning.
Gleitman et al. also attempted to show the dominance of the
semantic basis for the elicited judgments of young children.
The study included three children between 26 and 30 months
old. Their main data for evaluation of the metalinguistic
abilities in these children were the corrections the children
made of simple imperatives that they judged as "silly". Only
two of the three children in the study made any corrections
at all. One child made nine corrections. Three of the nine
corrections merely repeated the sentence to be corrected, two
of which were reversed order. Four of the corrections made
semantic changes. The second child made ten corrections of
sentences judged as "silly". Half of these "corrections"
changed word order that was already correct. Seven ~f the
ten corrections changed the imperative semantically.
Again, it is never doubted in this study that children would
know from natural language development that "Ball me the
bring" would be recognized as a reversed form of "Bring me
the ball". This study does not list all the sentences that
they used in testing the the metalinguistic abilities of
the 26 to 30 month old children, but they give a few examples
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including "Ball me the bring" of sentences that the children
were asked to correct. The researchers comment on the
children's inability to correct the sentences. They did
not seem to notice, though, that this sentence of four words
is twice the length of the average two-year-old.tsnean length
of utterance. It appears that the sentences may have been
above the children's linguistic performance level which would
most likely make it difficult to propose metalinguistic
corrections.
Hakes claimed that metalinguistic abilities do not begin to
emerge until age four, corresponding to the cognitive
development changes which Piaget has called the emergence
of concrete operational thought. Hakes studied one hundred
children ranging in age from 4 to 8 years. He included
conservation, comprehension, synonymy, acceptability and
phonemic segmentation tasks to test the correspondence of
metalinguistic abilities and the progression of cognitive
development as outlined by Piaget. In his study, Hakes
concentrated on the onset of syntactic judgments, rather
than the content-oriented (semantic) judgments. The acceptability tasks showed a distinct trend going from semantic
to syntactic judgments which he calls "adult judgments",
although he admits that adults who are looking for something
wrong in a sentence "wilz seize upon blatant falsity if there
is nothing else wrong."
Again, Hakes has made the assumption that "adult judgments",
or syntactic judgments, are a result of natural language
development. Some kind of indication that these judgments
do not result from natural language development would create
the need for an explanation for why the change takes place,
since the data does show a definite shift in how the judgments
are explained. The shift does coincide with the age at which
most children begin school. Let us explore how schooling
affects metalinguistic abilities.
If the transparency theory of language is valid in the case
of metalinguistic abilities - that is, if metalinguistic
abilities are present only if they are taught - then in adults
there should be a difference between those who have received
schooling and those who have not. In papers written by
Mary Hamilton and David Barton, literacy and schooling are
shown to have some effect on the metalinguistic abilities
of adult native speakers. In Barton's study, it was found
that ad~lts of low literacy leY3ls do make a high amount of
errors ln segmental awareness.
In Mary Hamilton's paper, the literacy of the adults was found
to have some effect on their metalinguistic abilitir~' but the
"differences between literacy levels were blurred."
She
concludes that schooling, more than literacy, affects the
metalinguistic abilities and cites recent work done by Cole
in which literacy and schooling were separated as independent
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factors. Cole worked with the Va i-speaking people of Africa,
some of whom were literate and others non-literate. Very few
had received formal schooling. Literacy did not seem to
have an effect on the people's metalinguistic abilities,
but responses varied "accor~!ng to whether or not people
received formal schooling."
Hakes states that "metalinguistic abilities show their
greatest devel~gment during middle childhood, roughly,
4 to 8 years."
This coincides with the child's entry
into the formal schooling atmosphere.
In light of the transparency theory of language, the studies
showing the onset of the ability to articulate metalinguistic
awareness as the child begins school and the absence of
metalinguistic abilities in unschooled adults as opposed to
schooled adults, it would appear that metalinguistic
abilities do result from schooling. Although the awarene5S
of metalinguistics seems to be present in preschool children
and unschooled adults, they are unable to articulate the
awareness. This would account for the fact that preschool
children are very capable of judging sentences as right
or wrong but are incapable of explaining many of their judgments or correcting incorrect sentences. Future studies
on the effects of schooling on metalinguistic abilities
in young children will be instumental in proving whether
or not the ability to articulate metalinguistic awareness
must be taught or if it is acquired through natural language
development.
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